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How to Tame The New Wild-Wild West: Potential Lassos for Virtual Crime
Introduction
Online virtual worlds have become, without equivocation, as advanced, complex,
and dynamic as the “real world” we grew up in. The advancements in these communities
has been rapid by and standards leaving a somewhat unusual situation in their wake. As
these communities continue to evolve they have, to varying degrees, come to replicate
certain parts of the real world, in particular, capitalist economies. The intricacies of
operating such a marketplace aside, their development has for some, served to provide a
striking example of the once theoretical, and presently realized, threat due to lack of
regulation.
As quick as these worlds have come into existence one might logically assume
that just as they replicate the real worlds economies so too would they with at least
baseline regulations however, that is not the case. Little if any efforts have been made to
regulate these booming economies as consequently, the illegal activities that are actively
policed in the modern day real world economy, have sprung up unchecked and to some
extent unhindered in the virtual setting. In particular, virtual worlds present a ripe
opportunity for money launderers and individuals or groups that seek to commit fraud –
most often the type of which would be dealt with by securities regulations.
This paper seeks to examine the money laundering schemes and securities
violations that have been, and if no changes are make, are likely to continue within
virtual communities. The first part of the paper provides an introduction into virtual
worlds, their economies, and isolated examples of the fraudulent activity already taking
place in virtual worlds. Part two provides baseline information into the practice of money
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laundering and then advances that understanding to explore how such activity can be
executed in the virtual setting. The third part of the paper will examine how existing
governmental bodies, branches, and legislation might serve to prevent and secure online
communities from these types of harmful illegal activity. The fourth and final section
provides some brief insight, and words of caution, for those charged with regulating
virtual worlds.

Part I: Welcome to the Virtual World
Virtual worlds began to take their most rudimentary form as early as the 1970s.1
The earliest virtual worlds were text-based, and allowed users to communicate, chat, and
interact with one another by typing set commands.2 As one might imagine the text based
worlds soon gave way to graphics based worlds which serve as the foundation of modern
virtual worlds.3
Eager to capitalize on the potential profit in this newly emerging market, the
video game industry soon began relying upon the multiplayer virtual world format.4 Until
the 1990s however, the video games developed were unlike the early text based worlds in
that they were not persistent. This is to say that once the game ended and the player
logged, off all trace of that player disappeared and the game reverted back to its initial
stage.5 Starting towards the tail end of the 90s, and in particular with the introduction of

1

Beth Simone Noveck, The State of Play, 49 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 1, 6 (2004) (nothing that early virtual
worlds evolved out of the text-based social environments of multi-user dungeons (also known as multiuser domains or dimensions) such as MUD1(1979) or LamdaMOO(1990)).
2
Id. (the text commands would allow a user to communicate actions to other users and thereby to act out
scenes and scenarios across a distance like an online Dungeons and Dragons).
3
Id. (“In a MUD, the fantasy is described exclusively through words, Subsequently, other designers, such
as Randall Farmer and Chip Morningstar, created graphical role-playing worlds like Habitat, the first multiuser domain with a graphical interface.”).
4
Id., at 7.
5
Id.
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Ultima Online, the persistent and social aspects of early text based worlds were unified
with the gaming elements of the industries, later in time, developed worlds.6 Upon its
introduction in 1998 Ultima7 received nearly a quarter million subscriptions and its
progeny, Lineage, came to attract more than 4 million; unquestionably then at this point
the MMORPG (Massively Multiplayer Online Role Playing Game) boom had begun. 8
Most recently there has been in influx of non-game play associated worlds such as
Second Life, the Sims, City of Heroes, and Eve Online. These reality based games do not
provide storyline or goals for their participants and instead merely serve as stage setters
for participants to engage in any activity they see fit. Most often these worlds provide
their users the ability to create and design a great deal of the content within the world;
this would certainly include clothing, possessions, and structures.9 In so doing, virtual
world administrators ensured not only exclusivity, but also independence from game
based worlds.10 Critically though, this means that so long as bandwidth is continually
provided these worlds will continue to exist, to expand, and to evolve.11 (emphasis added)

6

See generally, Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Napster’s Second Life?: The Regulatory Challenges of Virtual
Worlds, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1775, 1782-88 (2006).
7
See Noveck, supra note 1, at 7 (“Ultima Online linked the graphics or video games to the social and role
playing culture of MUDs to the internet in what is considered to be the first persistent, massivelymultiplayer commercial success.”).
8
See MMOGchar.com, An Analysis of MMOG Subscriptions Growth Version 23.0, available at
http://www.mmogchart.com/charts/ (the charts are most helpful in that they demonstrate clearly not only
the meteoric rise in popularity of MMORPGs but also, and more critical to the point at hand, that it was
indeed at the 1998 time period that began the MMORPG boom).
9
See Noveck, supra note 1, at 9 (noting the dual purpose of allowing users the ability to create their own
content as it fosters in world creativity and productivity while simultaneously cutting down of development
costs associate with building content).
10
Id., at 9-10.
11
It should be noted that the reality based worlds ability to continuously evolve provides the ability for true
growth and development however, it brings along with it an opportunity ripe for exploitation by means of
illegal activity.
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A Real Economy in a Virtual World
The developers and administrators have/had as their goal for these games, often
by way of significant contributions from its users, to create and establish a very realistic
world. Unsurprisingly then, as these reality based worlds come to mimic and adapt real
world customs and institutions, large and productive economies have sprung up.
Moreover, and undoubtedly more important to the issues to be examined in this paper,
many of the virtual economies have currency which has real world monetary value.
While this issue will be fleshed out later in the paper, for now Second Life can provide an
illustrative example.
Second Life, relative to the other reality based games, has a robust and diverse
economy all its own.12 Second life has its own currency called the Linden Dollar (“LD”)
which users rely upon to purchase virtual land, and pay for goods and services. The LD is
readily exchangeable for U.S. dollars at a rate that fluctuates with demand and can be
monitored on the Linden website.13 The exchangeability of LD into the U.S. dollars and
back again has been one of the most important aspects to the development of private

12

It should be noted that many commentators attriute the growth and popularity of Second Life and its
economy to the rather unique stance Linden Labs takes of intellectual property. Specifically, Second Life
allows its users to retain the intellectual property rights to any content which the user creates. As explained
by Linden labs:
Under Linden Lab’s Terms of Service, residents retain intellectual property rights in the
original content they create in the Second Life world, including avatar characters,
clothing, scripts, textures, objects and designs. The result is a vibrant marketplace of
Second Life content. If you create it, you can sell it, trade it, and even give it away for
free, subject of course to our Terms of Service.
See, Second Life, IP Rights, http://secondlife.com/whatis/iprights.php
13
See, LindeX Market Data, available at, http://secondlife.com/statistics/economy-market.php (as of March
2010 the exchange rate operated between 260-269 Linden Dollars to the U.S. Dollar); see also,
UsableMarkets, Linden Dollars vs. Other Currencies, Mar. 16, 2008, available at,
http://www.usablemarkets.com/2008/03/16/linden-dollars-vs-other-currencies/ (demonstrating that the
Linden Dollar along with the Yen, Euro, and Pound appreciated in value relative to the U.S. Dollar over a
period approaching four years).
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enterprise in Second Life.14 Paradoxically, the ready exchange of LD to other real world
currency also provides for a ripe opportunity for wrongdoers.
The economies of Second Life and its reality based virtual world counterparts
now represent a markets of significant size, and most likely power to boot.15 More
importantly, these economies are expected to grow further as more participants, hailing
from the world over seek to capitalize on the fertile ground of virtual commerce.16
A Threat Realized: Virtual Banks and Fraudulent Investment Schemes
Virtual economies represent sizeable financial opportunity and as such have attracted
quite a bit of interest and activity from both the legitimate as well as the less savory
online user. It really ought be of not great surprise that the virtual worlds that strive to
offer its users a realistic alternative to the real world see the rise, in some respects, in
illegal activity. While the threat of criminal activity remained largely theoretical in
MMORPGs developmental and initial stages, the communities in present day are
sophisticated and substantial17 enough to facilitate, if not permit, a worrying amount of

14

See, Chris Gourlay & Abul Taher, Virtual Jihad Hits Second Life Website, Sunday Times (U.K.), Aug.
5, 2007, at 4 (while the subject of the article is tangential to the point being made the authors noted that
according to Linden Labs several hundred thousand pounds a day were exchanged in Second Life).
15
Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: Second Life for Earth?, 2008 BYU L. Rev. 47, 84-85 (2008); see
also, Schonberger, supra note 6, at 1788 (citing a 2001 estimate of Everquest economy as having an GNP
of $135 million which at the time was equal to that of Russia); see also, Bobby Glushko, Tales of the
(Virtual) City: Governing Property Disputes in Virtual Worlds, 22 Berkley Tech L.J. 507, 524 (2007)
(noting that economists have estimated that the total gross domestic product of the virtual worlds exceeded
seven billion dollars in the year 2008 which is comparable to the gross domestic product of Estonia or the
Ivory Coast).
16
See, Ben Quarmby, Pirates Among the Second Life Islands – Why you Should Monitor the Misuse of
Your Intellectual Property in Online Virtual Worlds, 26 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 667, note 30 (2009) (the
author notes that while Second Life is an interesting example it is by no means the most popular or heavily
frequented virtual world on the market); see also, David Lazarus, Real Fear in Virtual Worlds, S.F. Chron.,
Sept. 15, 2006, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2006-09-15/business/17310324_1_san-francisco-slinden-lab-second-life-linden-dollars (noting that half of all Second Life users live outside the United
States).
17
See, Daniela Rosette, The Application of Real World Rules to Banks in Online Games and Virtual
Worlds, 16 U. Miami Bus L. Rev. 279, at 285 (2008) (Referring to Professor Edward Castronova of
California State University, Fullerton, who conducted an economic study in 2002 in which he estimated the
average hourly wage for Norrath (the fantasy world of Sony’s Online 430,000 player game, Everquest) to
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illegal activity. The following examples illustrate this very point, and while they do no
involved money laundering it should not require the leaping of any major intellectual
hurdles to see how they could have.
In the online MMORPG EVE Online18 a user recently set up an in-world bank.
The EVE Intergalactic Bank (“EIB”) as it was known, allowed players/users to deposit
in-game currency and in return receive a few percentage points of interest over a given
period of time.19 The bank operated for several months during which hundreds of players
deposited their money.20 Although its unlikely to have actually occurred, the bank at least
advertised loan and insurance products in addition to interest earning deposits21 and for
all intents and purposes EIB seemed every bit as real and legitimate a bank as those we
walk into every week.22 The EIB seemed a sound, natural progression in the thriving
capitalist economy EVE Online fostered as it played a key role in the facilitation of
entrepreneurial opportunity in the community.23

be about $3.42 and its Gross Domestic Product to be about $135 million. Moreover, if one assume the same
rates for other online games, such as Ultima Online, Dark Age of Comelot, Asheron’s Call, and Anarchy
Online, the workforce operating in these virtual worlds would generate more than $300 million in real
wealth every year).
18
Eve Online, Frequently Asked Questions: Eve Basics, available at
http://www.eveonline.com/faq/faq_01.asp (EVE Online is a popular science fiction based, persistent world
where players take the role of spaceship pilots seeking fame, fortune, and adventure in a massive “galaxy.”
The game enable participants to partake in player to player conflicts where the winner cans accumulate
substantial monetary rewards. The game also operates much like a system of real world corporations by
enabling participants to establish commercial and capitalist ventures where they can trade virtual items for
real currency.).
19
James Grimmelman, When Virtual Banks Fail, The Laboratorium, Aug. 2006, available at
http://laboratorium.net/archive/2006/08/26/when_virtual_banks_fail (noting that the interest rates “may be
high by offline standards, but it’s low for in-world ventures, abductively suggesting low risk. Indeed, the
falling value of the ISK versus the dollar (50% or more a year) made the EIB the practical equivalent of
treading water. It just beat holding useless ISK yourself and watching them depreciate.”)
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. (Grimmelman notes that “the EIB was doing what offline banks do—using its deposits to make
investments, and profiting from the spread in rates of return between them. Thus, it was acting as a true
financial intermediary, greasing the wheels of capitalism and, in effect, helping depositors and
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EIB however, in spite of the perceived economic gains it might otherwise derive
from legitimate business turned out to be an elaborate scam.24 Whether this was the case
from its inception or whether its proprietor(s) fell victim to the temptation that sat in front
of them on their computer screens is unclear.25 What is known is EIB’s proprietor(s)
decided to take the deposited money and run, taking away approximately 790 billion ISK
(EVE Online currency) which at the time equated to about $170,000.26 Despite the size of
the fraud, EIB was an unregulated online bank, and as such its hoodwinked investors and
depositors were without viable means of holding anyone liable.27
The economies of the virtual worlds have rapidly evolved almost entirely without
a countervailing and corresponding legal system for oversight and regulation. Indeed,
users can now purchase “stock” in virtual corporations and trade on in-game stock
markets.28 While the existence of these new investment schemes raises a host of issues
relating to securities regulation (a topic to be examined later in the paper) the potential
hazards are demonstrated via the “Nightfreeze scam.”29 The scam, set again in EVE
Online, involved a user named Nightfreeze who was able to entice several other users to
invests in a plan that would allow them collectively to purchase an in-game item that

entrepreneurs find each other. ISK were going to productive use, and presumably the economy was
humming along just a little faster.”).
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See Id. (Grimmelman believes that the EIB bank scam cam dangerously close to actionable real world
fraud and that had EIB existed in the United States and dealt in U.S. dollars the scam would indeed have
been actionable. In so noting Grimmelman gets at a key hurdle to any type of regulatory structure in online
worlds, that being jurisdiction.)
28
Post of Ed Felton to Freedom to Tinker, Virtual World, Meet Terrestrial Government, available at,
http://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/virtual-world-meet-terrestrial-government .
29
See generally, Nightfreeze, The Great Scam, available at www.wirm.net/nightfreeze/ (detailed
description of a small but successful fraudulent investment scheme perpetrated on the virtual community
EVE Online).
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individually they could not.30 Nightfreeze’s investment plan turned out to be a scam that
allowed him to walk away with a real world value of $1,000.31 Without question,
Nightfreeze’s scheme, had it taken place in the real world would have fit neatly into the
Securities Exchange Commission’s widely accepted and enforce definition of a security
and thereby permit an avenue for recovery and regulation.32
As these two examples demonstrate, much of virtual worlds are presently
unregulated in any meaningful way, allowing wrongdoers the chance to prey upon the
unsuspecting or unprepared. The following section will examine how virtual worlds, and
their lack of regulation, may be facilitating money laundering and what consequences it
might have in the real world.
Part II: Money Laundering 101
What is it and Why do we Care?
The practice of filtering illegally obtained currency through a transaction or series
of transactions in order to transform the “dirty” money into “clean” currency which can
thereafter be used legitimately is by definition money laundering.33 This process allows
the reaches of a given criminal enterprise to enter the lawfully operating economy or
commerce. Given the fact that good deal of money laundering goes undetected,
compiling numbers on how much is actually occurring is not an exact science however,

30

Id.
Id.
32
See, 15 USC §77b(a)(1) (2000); see also, Securities Act 1933 §2(a)(1) (providing that a security shall
be defined as any note, stock, treasury stock, security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness,
certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement…any interest or instrument
commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing).
33
See, U.S. Gen. Accounting Off. (GAO), Money Laundering: Efforts in the Securities Industry, GAO-02111 (Oct. 10, 2001), at pg 1, available at, www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-111 (the link provides
direct route to a pdf version of the document)
31
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Congress has estimated that money laundering may amount to 2-5 percent of global gross
domestic product.34 Officially speaking, Congress states that money launderers subvert
legitimate financial mechanisms and banking relationships by using them as protective
covering for the movement of criminal proceeds and the financing of crime and
terrorism.35 Congress continues to maintain that in so doing, money laundering threatens
the safety of United States citizens and undermines the integrity of United States
financial institutions and of the global financial and trading systems upon which
prosperity and growth depend.36
To be sure, money laundering is most often a diverse and complex process but at
its core is comprised of three independent steps that may or may not occur
simultaneously.37 The initial process, through deposits or other means, of placing
unlawful cash proceeds into traditional financial institutions is known as “placement.”38
The next step, “layering”, is the process of separating the proceeds of criminal activity
from their origin through the use of complex layers of financial transactions.39
“Integration,” the final of the three stages is the reintroduction of the money into the
economy through the use of apparently legitimate transactions that serve to disguise the

34

See, Uniting and Strengthening America Act by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No 107-56 115 Stat. 272 (2001) [hereinafter “USA PATRIOT
Act] (to provide a more concrete understanding of just how much money laundering Congress is estimating
with their global GDP figure, it would likely land in the $600,000,000,000.00 category); see also,
Computer, Telecommunications Skills Will Drive Future World Crime Waves, Money Laundering Alert,
Apr. 2001, at LEXIS/Banking/General News & Information (estimating this same number to be closer to
$2trillion annually and between $100-300billion in the United States).
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
See, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller’s Handbook: Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering
(September 2000), at 2 [hereinafter Comptroller’s Handbook].
38
Id.
39
Id. (Examples of transactions that are most often used in the layering stage of money laundering include
converting cash into traverlers checks, money orders, wire transfers, letters of credit, stocks, bonds, or
purchasing valuable assets such as jewelry or art.).
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illegal funds.40 To the extent a criminal is successful in these processes their money is
essentially “washed” and presumably will be used to continue some facet of the criminal
enterprises and will do so without arousing any suspicions by law enforcement.
Money laundering is a critical component of any type of continuous organized
criminal activity.41 Organized crime, in a general sense, would be unable to bankroll its
ongoing criminal activities without the access to the legitimate financial systems that
money laundering forges for illegal/dirty funds.42 Furthermore, money laundering permits
the criminal enterprise to move, hide, and secure against confiscation by authorities of
potentially enormous amounts of wealth.43 Logically then, money laundering might
permit any criminal enterprise to escape the reaches of law enforcement but most
recently, and no doubt most worryingly, it has become closely associated with
international crime and terrorism.44 Indeed, the investigations into the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks of sparked a turning point for anti-money laundering legislations in
the United States.45
The increased regulation, scrutiny, and transparency in the financial system has
forced criminals to develop new and more creative ways to clean their money to avoid
detection.46 By structuring transactions below certain reporting thresholds, mixing illegal

40

Id. (The Handbook provides a non-exhaustive list of financial transactions that are often used in the
integration stage which includes sham loans or false import/export invoices.).
41
See, Andres Rueda, The Implications of Strong Encryption Technology on Money Laundering, 12 Alb.
L.J. Sci&Tech. 1, 8 (2001).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See, Selena Nelson, Note, Regulating Money Laundering in the United State and Hong Kong: A Post 911 Comparison, 6 Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev. 723, 726 (2007) (Because money is most vulnerable at
the placement stage, U.S. legislation has focused here by regulating financial institutions. Regulations
including “Know Your Customer” identification requirements, Currency Transaction Reports for amounts
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funds with the legitimate funds of a cash intensive business (e.g. restaurant, hotel,
casino), or using trade based money laundering techniques criminals have quickly
adapted to the change in law.47 Criminals that have the financial necessity to launder
money have demonstrated an intelligence beyond that of the common criminal. One
would imagine however, that if presented with an equally effective and less restrictive
method to clean their money they would justifiably jump at the opportunity. The lack of
regulation combined with the interconnectedness on a truly global scale, of virtual
communities might provide such an avenue.
Money Laundering via Virtual Worlds and Their Banks
In what has been coined “Real Money Trade” (“RMT”) within the industry,
individuals can exchange virtual items or currency for offline, real world currency.48
Most often this exchange takes place by way of internet banks, internet auctions, and
increasingly via the mechanics of the virtual worlds themselves.49 This exchange is made
possible through the notion, which the EIB and Nightfreeze scam ought to have at least
impliedly made clear, that virtual property (e.g. land, buildings, items, or currency) has
developed a real world value. And, quite naturally that real world value is something
individuals are now seeking to capitalize upon.
Second Life alone reports that it handles over $400,000 in virtual currency each
day, supports several thousand businesses, and in certain cases has allowed entrepreneurs

over $10,000, and Suspicious Activity Reports aim at destroying criminal anonymity and detecting illegal
funds).
47
Id.
48
See Gregory Boyd & Matthew E. Moersfelder, Global Business in the Metaverse: Money Laundering
and Securities Fraud, The SciTech lawyer, Winter 2007, at 4.
49
Id.
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to earn over $200,000 per year in real world income.50 Taking a wider vantage point,
certain reports estimate the value of RMT transactions on an annual basis to be in excess
of $200million.51 The numbers, aside from being staggering for such a recent
phenomena, demonstrate the RMT is potentially a viable and avenue for money
laundering.52
People that are in possession of illegally obtained money will always be seeking
means by which to legitimize the funds so that they can be spent safely. While doing this
has traditionally meant the funneling of dirty money through brick and mortar
institutions, RMT makes available a new, more efficient, and more direct means to
launder money.53 The traditional means of money laundering have required the need to
physically relocate money over borders, requisite taxation, and compliance with reporting
standards for businesses and financial intuitions.54 Consider the following example
illustrating how an overseas criminal might transfer large sums of money across borders
into the United States:
First, a foreign criminal buys $500,000 worth of virtual currency for a
certain virtual world. Depending on the virtual world, it is possible to
purchase through third parties with minimal recording of the transaction
and the absence of personally identifiable information required for an
international wire transfer. After the criminal obtains the virtual currency,
he can gain access to the virtual world and distribute that currency to two
other player accounts. One account is for an associate in New York; the
other for an associate in Los Angeles. Those associates can now use a
third-party transaction to “cash out” that virtual currency.55
50

See, Rosette, supra note 17, at 290 citing Peter Yellowlees, Virtual Online Worlds: Living a Second
Life, The Economist, Sept. 30, 2006 at 77-8.
51
See, Boyd, supra note 5.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id. (The authors note that there is no reason the recipients have to be in the United States and that the
sending party and the receiving parties can be almost anywhere in the world. It is also possible, although it
only adds what might be unnecessarily precautionary steps, to convert currency into virtual worlds or to go
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The transaction described above has allowed a sizeable amount of money over
international borders with no governmental regulation or reporting, little if any risk, and
can usually completed in less than 24 hours.56 It is frequently the case that the virtual
game hosts themselves maintain no record of transactions and so the practice of such
record keeping by the banks themselves would unlikely,57 unnecessary, and potential
unwise.
The individual structural make up of each virtual world is often critical in
determining whether or not it is suited for money laundering. Not all virtual worlds allow
virtual currency and those that do can be separated into games which have sanctioned and
those that unsanctioned currency trades.58 Worlds with unsanctioned currency trade often
contain third party intermediaries operating on a black market within the world and
consequently transactional costs increase to process currency into and out of the virtual
world.59 On the other hand, some worlds sanction the currency trade and will even
process the transaction itself.60 Regardless of whether the currency exchange is

though multiple virtual worlds or accounts but in so doing some of the efficiencies of moving money in this
manner will obviously be lost.).
56
Id. (It should be noted that despite taking funds from outside the United States in this example and
funneling them in that the process at no point involved a bank, speaking to anyone, travel, and it is unlikely
that any tax or game records of the transaction exist.).
57
Id.
58
Id., at 5.
59
Id.
60
Id. (In the instances in which the virtual world operators sanction a currency trade in addition to
processing transactions which take place there is normally a fee associated. Most often that fee is minimal
and almost certainly less than the cost to conduct a similar transaction via a third party intermediary
operating on a currency black market in a world with an unsanctioned currency trade. The only potential
downside to this type of transaction is the increased level of traceability. The lack of a third party
intermediary for the exchange means that currency will mean a more direct transaction with fewer steps
from start to finish.).
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sanctioned or not early research indicates that currency can be moved with an efficiency
ranging between 90 and 98 percent.61
Part III: Fixing the Problem
Clean-As-You-Go: Regulation from the Inside
Historically speaking the notion of regulation through the efforts of the game
developers themselves has been unwelcome. Game developers have put forth several
arguments in support of their “hands-off” stance. Some have argued that online games are
merely games, and thus people who invest in them lose nothing of real value.62 Others
have proffered a “swim at your own risk” response stating that people who invest in
online games understand that nature of the games and do so at their own risk.63 Certain
commentators posit that the relative lawlessness experienced in certain virtual
communities is a direct result of this shortsighted approach taken by game developers.64
Despite being late to respond, some game developers have taken a more proactive
approach. Second life for example, does not allow users who have been registered for
more than forty-five days from trading more than $2,000 worth of virtual currency inside
of a thirty-day period.65 Further still, in August of 2007 Second Life banned gambling
following an Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”) examination into virtual casinos.66

61
62
63
64
65
66

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Grimmelman, supra note 19.
See, Rosette, supra note 17, citing Second Life, http://www.secondlife.com
See, Adam Pasick, FBI Checks Gambling in Second Life Virtual World, Reuters, Apr. 4, 2007, available

at,
http://www.reuters.com/article/technologyNews/idUSHUN43981820070405?pageNumber=1&virtualBran
dChannel=0; see also, Rachel Konrad, "Second Life" Bans Gambling, ABC News, Aug. 2, 2007, available
at, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3440536&page=1; see also, Posting of Robin Linden on
Official Second Life Blog, available at http://blog.secondlife.com/2007/07/25/wagering-in-second-lifenew-policy/ .
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While it is likely that Second Life’s invitation to the FBI and the subsequent abolishment
of gambling was spurred by political pressure, they nevertheless took critical steps to
prevent illegal activity, and in this specific matter cut off a potential route for money
laundering.67
Relying exclusively on regulation and enforcement by internal administrators or
owners would not however, be a practical solution. Beyond the problem of policing an
economy of such volume, certain technologies may stand in the way of effective
reporting. Initially, Linden Lab required users to provide a valid credit car or Paypal
account, or to respond to a cell phone SMS text message, in order to open an account.68
As it stands now, and how it has been since June 6, 2006 users can create an account with
nothing more than an e-mail address.69 In the event that authorities are in search of a
suspicious transaction from likely terrorists, Linder Labs would be unable – assuming
that the user registered after June 6, 2006 – to provide even so much as a name. While
there might still be the potential that Linden could provide the user’s IP address a variety
of software companies have widely commercialized programs that allow users’
computers to generate a new IP address each time they sign on.70

67

See, Susan W. Brenner, Fantasy Crime: The Role of Criminal Law in Virtual Worlds, 11 Vand. J. Ent. &
Tech. L. 1, at 59 (2008) (In 2007 Europol and the United Kingdom’s Serious Organized Crime Agency
voiced concerns that criminal ands terrorists were using Second Life to launder money. Only a few months
prior, Britain’s Fraud Advisory Panel identified a growing risk of theft, fraud, money laundering, and tax
evasion in virtual worlds. In 2008, after Second Life had abolished gambling, U.S. Attorney General
Michael Mukasey stated that Second Life, and other virtual communities, had created new avenues for
money laundering.).
68
See, Posting of Robin Linden to Second Life Blog,
https://blogs.secondlife.com/community/features/blog/2006/06/28/update-open-registration
69
See, Posting of Wagner James Au, http://gigaom.com/2007/07/04/second-life-avatar-sued-for-copyrightinfringement/; see also, Second Life, Registration Page, available at
https://join.secondlife.com/?ref=eurobestshop.info (link provides the actual page prompted upon a person
seeking to register in Second Life and demonstrates that only an email address is required).
70
See, Posting of Wagner James Au, supra note 70; see also, CNET download search “Hide IP”,
http://download.cnet.com/1770-20_4-
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Virtual world administrators and operators are not without options. Assuming that
a virtual world in fact has currency and furthermore a currency exchange operating, both
the structure of the exchange and a currency cap can serve as effective tools to combat
money laundering. Certain online worlds have established exchange rates which will
rapidly deteriorate as the amount of virtual currency sold increases.71 Consequently, if a
money launderer was attempting to transfer virtual currency back out into real world
currency, whether he decided to do so all at once or spread over several transactions, the
cash out value would be significantly reduced. Naturally, as the cash out value decreases
the efficiencies of virtual world money laundering seize to exist. Alternatively, a virtual
world, as Second Life has already done, can place a cap on the amount of money a
registered user can exchange in a given time period.72 Given the relative ease with which
a person can register a user in Second Life one has to pause to think whether this cap is
effective, in any way, at deterring money laundering. Commentators are quick to note
that these methods are nothing more than undersized patches to a gaping hole. As the
economies of these virtual worlds grow, larger transactions will be possible without
having a dramatic shift in exchange rates thereby allowing more money to be transferred
with a much higher efficiency.73
Virtual world money laundering even at its most basic level clearly can provide
an efficiency related attractiveness to potential money launderers. As the methodology
0.html?query=hide+IP&tag=srch&searchtype=downloads&filterName=platform%3DWindows&filter=plat
form%3DWindows (A simple search into CNET for software that can hide, alter, and/or mask a user’s IP
address returns 102 products that might be of use many of which are available for free trials periods); see
also, Gourlay & Taher, supra note 14 (“Intelligence sources said that although communications traffic
though Second Life could in theory be monitored, often the only means of tracking an individual is by
tacing the user’s IP address – the physical location of a computer in the real world – but even this can be
faked.”)
71
See Boyd, supra note 48, at 5.
72
Id.
73
Id.
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becomes more technical, assuming it is not already, these efficiencies could increase
beyond their already impressive level. The more technologically savvy criminal might
employ the use of “bots” to assist his operations. A bot is a computer controlled entity
functioning within a virtual world designed to simulate a human player that operates
through pre-written command language or potentially low level artificial intelligence.74
Bots have already been used to perpetrate online crimes in the virtual world Lineage II.75
While using bots in a money laundering context would prove more complex than a petty
theft ring there is no reason to think it impossible or unlikely.
The Courts: Early Signs of a Receptive “Bench”
Discussion of various applicable regulatory regimes to thwart money laundering
and fraudulent investment schemes in virtual worlds would be of little merit if the judicial
systems themselves were unwilling or unable to enforce. Case in point, neither the
Nightfreeze, nor the EIB bank scam has led to any punishment of the perpetrators.76 In
both instances a major defense has been that they were part of a game and therefore,
anyone that invested in the schemes did not, and by definition could not, lose anything of
real value.77 Furthermore, many virtual worlds state that the risk and trust necessary to
operate in their “laizze-faire” style regulated worlds are a critical and identifying
component of their product’s experience to its users.78 Ultimately, the question is: when,
74

Jeffrey Bardzell, Markus Jakobsson, Shaowen Bardzell, Tyler Pace, Will Odom, Aaron Houssian,
Virtual Worlds and Fraud: Approaching Cybersecurity in Massively Multiplayer Online Games, available
at www.digra.org/dl/db/07311.42219.pdf.
75
Ian Douglas, Virtual Criminals are Just Human, Telegraph.co.uk, Nov. 15, 2007, available at
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/3625241/Virtual_criminals_are_just_human/ (“A gang
of teenagers made automated characters (known as ‘bots’) to live in the game, attack real characters and
steal their money. In 2005 Lineage II artifacts were tradeable on eBay, so this was real violence, real theft,
real crime, just perpetrated through a computer.”).
76
See, Boyd Supra note 72, at 6-7.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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if ever, does a game become, for legal purposes, a real investment of real value albeit into
virtual items from virtual worlds? The answer to this question will likely be fertile
grounds for debate and controversy. To the extent it is not answered by legislative bodies
around the world, certain judiciaries have already started to provide insight into the
matter.
The 1st Cir. provides vital guidance for the United States courts specific to,
whether they are willing to view a game as having real world significance. In SEC v. Sg
Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001) defendant, Sg Ltd (“Sg”) offered a website which hosted
an “investment game” where virtual investors used offline currency to purchase shares
offered by Sg in virtual companies that had no real world equivalent.79 Sg advertised that
investors could buy and sell at posted prices and to do so was without risk because prices
would inevitably continue to rise.80 Sg eventually suspended trading activity and with it
the ability of any investors to withdraw funds from the game.81 The SEC eventually filed
suit alleged the “game” was within the definition of an “investment contract.”82
Predictably, Sg proffered the “game defense” positing that none of what the virtual
investors lost had any real value.83
The District Court of Massachusetts beneath it maintained the SEC had failed to
meet the summary judgment burden. The court stated that all the transactions were in the
context of a game and that while participants were looking for financial gain the scenario
more closely resembled gambling than an investment scheme.84 The district court
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See, SEC v. Sg Ltd., 265 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2001).
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
See, SEC v. Sg Ltd, 142 F. Supp 2d 126 (Dist. Mass. 2001).
80
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provides, albeit in a well written manner, an opinion implicitly endorsing the game
defense. On appeal the 1st Cir. then only had before it the issues of whether the SEC had
alleged sufficient facts to survive summary judgment.85 Reversing and remanding, the
Circuit held that the SEC had in fact alleged sufficient facts to survive summary
judgment.86 In so doing the viability of the game defense is no doubt undercut as the
context of an online game was insufficient for the court to view Sg’s actions as nothing
more than gambling but ultimately the viability of the game defense was left, on an
explicit level, untouched.87 Importantly however, the court did take the time to note that
Sg’s website disclaimers regarding the “rules of the game” would not be enough to
dismiss the SEC complaint.88 In doing so, the court takes a clear stance demonstrating a
willingness to look beyond gaming disclaimers and to the actual actions of the parties
involved and the seriousness of the consequences even when occurring in a virtual
world.89 Despite SEC v. Sg Ltd potential impact on the ability to secure convictions
against virtual crime in the real world, the United States on an international level is
behind the curve.90

85

See, SEC v. Sg Ltd, supra note 79.
Id.
87
Id. (The court ultimately found that the SEC had alleged facts which, if proven, satisfied the three-part
Howey test and supported its assertion that the opportunity to invest in the shares described on defendant's
website constituted an invitation to enter into an investment contract within the jurisdictional reach of the
securities laws.).
88
Id.
89
See, Boyd, supra note 75, at 7.
90
See, Eric Weslander, Virtual-Reality Crimes Present Literal Challenge for Real-Life Police,
LJWorld.com, Nov. 12, 2006, available at
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2006/nov/12/virtualreality_crimes_present_literal_challenge_re/ (Providing
the example of Carissa Hill. Mrs. Hill, a resident of Lawrence, Kansas, called the local police in early 2006
because her avatar had been stolen by an online scam artist who had stolen another online character’s
identitiy in the game. In the scam Hill had been cheated out of Linden dollars as well and not knowing what
else to do called the local police. The police, however, were unable to provide any assistance having no
understanding of what to do or how to handle the matter.)
86
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Virtual worlds are very much a global phenomenon as such examination into the
more progressive laws and judicial actions taking place in other countries can serve as
good indicator of what is to come on a wider scope. China has developed law designed to
regulate and protect virtual interests.91 Indeed, multiple convictions have already been
secured against perpetrators of virtual theft. In 2003 a user of the game Red Moon filed
suit against the game operators.92 The user had, at great personal expense and, over a
lengthy period of time gathered an array of virtual weapons, that rendered him invincible
within the game.93 A hacker then broke into this user’s account and proceeded to pilfer
the hard earned weaponry.94 The user contacted Red Moon’s operator who promptly
refused to provide any information regarding the hackers identity.95 In court the gaming
company argued that virtual properties were simply “piles of data” without any real
world value.96 The court held that the user was entitled to compensation, in this instance
in the form of the administrators returning the stolen weapons.97
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See, Jamie J. Kayser, Note, The New New World: Virtual Property and the End-User License
Agreement, 27 Loy. L.A. Ent. L. Rev. 59 (2006).
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Id., at 66-67.
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See, Id.; see also, Jay Lyman, Gamer Wins Lawsuit in Chinese Court Over Stolen Virtual Winnings,
TechNewsWorld, Dec, 19, 2003, available at
http://www.technewsworld.com/story/32441.html?wlc=1269359633 (reporting that the user in this instance
has amassed an arsenal of virtual biological weapons which allegedly was the culmination of more than
two years of work and an investment of $1,200 USD).
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See, Kayser, supra note 87, at 67.
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Id. (It should also be mentioned that the user contacted the police in this instance as well. Despite the
more progressive stance China seems to have taken on virtual property theft, and implicitly against the
“game defense” theory, the police did not provide any assistance to the user in this instance. Exactly why
this is the case is uncertain.)
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See, Lyman, supra note 89 (Interestingly the article further demonstrates that value that users of the
virtual worlds place on the property and items they attain in game by citing a rash of real-world gang
killings in Asia the causes of which stem from a popular game “Lineage.”).
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See, Kayser, supra note 87, at 67; see also, Joshua A.T. Fairfield, Virtual Property, 85 B.U. L. Rev.
1047, at 1084 (2005) (the case, Li Hongchen v. Beijing Arctic Ice Technology Development Co., was
decided by the Beijing Second Intermediate Court who is apparently well known for its decisions in the
field of intellectual property)
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Foreign governments, who because of the incredible popularity of virtual world
games in their countries, have made what appears to be best efforts to address the
problems of virtual crime. The Chinese Public Safety Ministry issued an advisory letter to
law enforcement on how to handle and punish the theft of virtual property98. As early as
2004, South Korea alone had recorded over 10,000 arrests for theft of virtual property, a
great deal of which resulted in convictions.99 In the countries with the highest levels of
participation in virtual worlds government, law enforcement, and more importantly, the
judiciaries have taken an unequivocal stance that virtual property is of real value and that
the game defense is not viable.100
The Feasibility of Applying Existing Regulation to a Virtual World
The plausibility, and some might argue inevitability, to the application of existing
regulatory regimes to virtual worlds to get a hold of money laundering and securities
violations ought be common sense. As we have seen virtual worlds, at least those which
present potential problems, have duplicated with precision the capitalist market structures
of developed real world nations. While the regimes to be explored bellow might appear
98

See, Fairfield, supra note 93, at 1085 (It seems that Chinese authorities had little choice but to issue the
letter given the rising increasing amount of virtual theft. Around the same time period as the Arctic Ice case
the Beijing Evening News reported the sentencing of two 17-year-old boys for the theft of virtual property.
Police in Chengdu were also investigating the theft of roughly RMB 50,000 worth of virtual equipment.
Numerous other complaints of theft of virtual property had been filed, and the number of incidents is rising
month by month.).
99
Id., at 1088 (“A recent BBC article reported that South Korean police received 22,000 cybercrime
complaints related to virtual property in the previous year - over half the total number of cybercrimes
reported in South Korea. 216 A Korean newspaper recently noted that 10,187 South Korean teenagers were
arrested for theft of virtual property in a single year - over 28 per day.”).
100
Id., at 1087 (South Korea and Taiwan, two of the world’s most “wired” nations have developed
significant legal framework for virtual crime. South Korea is commonly described as the world's "most
wired society," with the greatest per-capita adoption of broadband connections. Taiwan has developed a
useful and comprehensive body of case law protecting virtual property from forcible or fraudulent
expropriation. Taiwanese law requires the victim of theft of virtual property to file a police complaint
before prosecution can proceed. But even with that caveat, Taiwanese jurisprudence boasts hundreds of
cases on virtual property covering theft, fraud, and even robbery. Since 2003, the cause of action of theft
has been revised to include the taking of another's electronic record without cause. Prosecutions under this
revised statute have become routine.).
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somewhat disparate relative to each other, their working in concert is critical to making
virtual worlds a secure financial environment. As the EIB bank scam demonstrates
banking institutions are becoming, if not already, accepted business inside the presently
unregulated virtual worlds. While EIB was a short lived scam the potential for money
laundering or the facilitation of securities fraud might well increase with a more
established and permanent virtual bank.
Money Services Businesses
The Bank Security Act (“BSA”) enacted in 1970 enables the Secretary of
Treasury to issue regulatory measures which require certain reports and disclosures be
made by operations fitting the provided definition of a “financial institution.”101 As might
be expected, financial enterprises such as banks, securities firms, and insurance
companies are subject to different, and more stringent, regulation than non-financial
institutions.102 The BSA currently regulate a great deal of depository institutions, among
them banks, credit unions, casinos, securities brokers and dealers, and money services
businesses (“MSBs”).103
The BSA mandates that financial institutions maintain continuous and detailed
record keeping and reporting systems.104 In so doing, the BSA has the financial
institutions themselves create and keep the paper trail that serves the dual purpose of
deterring illegal activity and assists law enforcement in their investigations.105 The
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Financial Crime Enforcement Network, Regulatory: Overview, http://www.fincen.gov/reg_main.html
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See, Rosette, supra note 17, citing, Caroline Bradley, Banks in Online Games, International Finance
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ultimate objective of the BSA’s regulations is to prevent financial institutions from being
used by criminals to hide, deposit, or transfer illegal funds.106
In a continued effort to control money laundering the Secretary of Treasury issued
a series of rules to apply to the actions of MSBs.107 In 1999 the Secretary ruled that “a
business that meets one or more of the definitions of a type of MSB is an MSB” and
therefore would need to comply with the applicable BSA requirements as an MSB
generally, its specific type of MSB, and as a financial institution in general.108 MSBs are
defined as institutions handling business transactions including money orders, money
transfers, check cashing, traveler’s checks, currency dealing, currency exchange, and
stored value.109 It would seem that both online virtual banks and virtual currency
exchanges (sanctioned or non-sanctioned) would nearly fit within the defined sphere of
an MSB. At the very least even a rudimentary online virtual banks’ activities of taking
deposits, making loans, and transferring funds would facially satisfy the definition of
“money transmitters.”110
The regulatory measures ought under the BSA in general, and the MSBs more
specifically, make difficult the laundering of money though virtual worlds. Among the
requirements for MSBs they are required to develop and implement an anti-money
106
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See, FINCEN Reg., Am I an MSB?, available at,
http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/amimsb.html; see also, 31 CFR Ch. 1 Part 103 –
Financial Record Keeping and Reporting of Currency and Foreign Transactions, Subpart A (uu) (this will
provide the complete regulatory definition of “money services businesses.”).
108
Id.
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Id.
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Id.; see also, FinCEN Ruling 2004-3 – Definition of Money Services Business (Money
Transmitter/Currency Dealer or Exchanger), August 17, 2004, available at,
http://www.fincen.gov/news_room/rp/rulings/html/fincenruling20043.html (“any other person engaged as a
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laundering system (“AML”) compliance system.111 Certain MSBs are required to
maintain a list of any agents they have.112 In addition, if an MSB has suspicion,
knowledge, or reasons to suspect any transaction as non-legitimate and it includes
aggregate funds of $2,000 or more it must file a Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”) with
the Secretary of Treasury.113 Importantly, an MSB that provides a money transfer of
$3,000 or more, or currency exchange of $1,000 or more to any customer within a period
of 24 hours must maintain a record of that transaction.114
MSBs and other qualifying institutions, operating under the BSA, face penalties
for non-compliance. Depending on the specific factual circumstances a financial
institution can be required to submit up to five reports to the government. A reporting
violation can carry with it civil and criminal liability.115 Furthermore, section 314(b) of
the PATRIOT Act permits financial institutions that have already provided notice to the
Department of Treasury to share information with the federal government in order to
identify and fend off activities that may involve money laundering or terrorism.116 Lastly,

111

See, FINCEN Reg., Money Services Businesses Home Page, available at
http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/index.html.
112
Id.
113
Id.; see also, FINCEN Reg., Money Services Businesses Suspicious Activity Report (SAR), available
at, http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/msbsar.html (the website provides the more expansive
definition of what suspicious activity consists of: (1)Involves funds derived from illegal activity or is
intended or conducted in order to hide or disguise funds or assets derived from illegal activity, or (2) is
Designed to evade the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, whether through structuring or other means,
or (3) Serves no business or apparent lawful purpose, and the reporting business knows of no reasonable
explanation for the transaction after examining all available facts.).
114

Id.
See, FINCEN Reg., SAR Reporting Penalties, available at,
http://www.fincen.gov/financial_institutions/msb/definitions/penalties_A.html ; see also, 31 USC §5313,
available at, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/31/usc_sec_31_00005313----000-.html; see also, 31 USC
§5321, available at, http://law.justia.com/us/codes/title31/31usc5321.html ; see also, 31 USC §5322,
available at, http://trac.syr.edu/laws/31/31USC05322.html.
116
See, FINCEN Reg., US PATRIOT Act Information, available at,
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/patriot/index.html.
115

25

Ian M.B. Leyden
it should be noted that the BSA contains pertinent language regarding foreign-based
transactions.117 Due to the fact that virtual worlds are often global in their reach the threat
of money laundering from outside the boarders of the United States are most critical.118
The application of MSB requirements through the BSA to virtual worlds, just as it
is in the real world, would not render money laundering impossible. It would however,
significantly affect the efficiencies with which money laundering could be done and
thereby the impetus to do so within these virtual communities. Money laundering in
virtual worlds is viable precisely because of these regulations not having been
implemented. Admittedly, MSB regulation is only one piece of a more complicated
puzzle in preventing virtual worlds from being taken advantage of by money launderers.
For regulation to truly be effective it will require the tracking of money flows, monitoring
transactions, and taxation or some taxing authority of personal and business income
generated in virtual worlds.119
Application of Securities Regulation to Virtual Worlds
The term “investment contract” operates as one of the SEC’s most useful terms.
Serving as a catch-all, the term extends securities laws to the non-obvious financial
arrangements. Courts have been liberal in their interpretation of what satisfies as an
“investment contract” limiting its reach, on a general sense, only to where there is no
117
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perceived investment interest/value.120 As we have seen, the notion that what is invested
in a virtual worlds is without “real value” has largely been rejected and, to the extent it
retains any foothold its grip is tenuous at best.
The current test to determine whether a particular financial instrument is an
“investment contract” and therefore a security was set forth in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,
328 U.S. 293 (1946). The established test states that an “investment contract” is: (1) the
investment of money; (2) in a common enterprise; (3) with the expectation of profits
derived solely from the efforts of others.121 In addition, the court stated that this test must
be applied in light of the economic realities of the transaction; the substance of the
transaction will govern its form.122 The broad definition and interpretation by the courts
demonstrates quite clearly that to the extent the test is satisfied the SEC will regard that
product an investment contract and thereby a security.123
This expansive “investment contract” test taken together with the previously
discussed SEC v. Sg Ltd. indicates that the substance over form framework will continue
to persist in virtual worlds as well. While the court did not answer the ultimate question
of whether the users of the website were paying for an investment or a game the court did
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cosmetics).
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provide some insight to what it would be likely to do.124 As previously discussed, the
First Circuit looked past the posted online disclaimers regarding the financial instruments
and the parties’ actions. While subtle, this move has prompted many commentators to
confidently state that the court would have, and will if need be in the future, not honor a
game defense while applying the Howey “investment contract” test.125
A Word of Caution When Regulators Come Knocking on the Virtual Door
The verbatim application of existing regulation to virtual worlds might well have
some chilling effects to the economies of virtual worlds. For example, if securities laws
were to be applied to virtual worlds in the exact same way that they are in the real world
the end result might not be a desired one.126 More specifically, if the SEC were to require
registration of offerings in virtual worlds it would have a significant chilling affect on
virtual economies. The cost of registration is most often hundreds of thousands of dollars
while the amount raised in a virtual world public offering is significantly less. An IPO
that occurred on the Second Life Capital Exchange offered nearly 600,000 shares at
$L5.127 This offering, depending on the exact exchange rate, generated between $11,000
– 12,000 which would be wholly insufficient to cover the prevailing cost of going
public.128 Ultimately, the enforcement of certain securities laws will deter business
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development, the raising of capital, and in the end the viability of continued expansion of
virtual economies.129
Part IV: A Final Word for Our Virtual Regulators To Be
To conclude then, while this paper does advocate a quick and strong application
of existing regulatory regimes it does not support such application blindly. The small
scale that virtual world economies operate upon – at least relative to the economies the
regulations were designed for – necessitate a thoughtful selection and adaptation of
regulations. For those people charged with making these decisions they ought focus most
upon those regulations that will deter and complicate schemes designed to defraud users
or establish institutions to facilitate money laundering with an eye towards the unwanted
potential that overbroad regulation will do much harm to a new and potentially invaluable
resource in virtual worlds.

underwriter's fee, going public can cost a company up to 15% of the total amount raised in the real world
economy. The amount of money raised in a virtual setting pales in comparison and as such makes it largely
impossible to accomplish. In this article the expert interviewed concluded that he would find it hard to
conceive a paper going public for anything under $100,000.).
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